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Mind body problem has been a difficult problem in philosophy, and ii has attracted many 
philosophers. Since modem science proposed a scientific world view, the location of our mind 
has been threatened, and many philosophers have been worried about how our mind should be 
located in material world. Descartes' pineal gland is one example of their struggles. 
John Locke accepted the corpuscular hypothesis developed by Robert Boyle etc., and 
constructed his epistemology on that theory. Our perception has sensible aspects as color 
sensation, sound sensation and tangible sensation, etc. Moreover. it seems to be certain that 
these sensations exist. But Locke or Descartes thinks that these aspects cannot have a place in 
material world. Modem scientists or philosophers thought that our material world has only 
quantitative qualities, for example extension. size, weight etc. Therefore these sensations or 
sensible qualities must be in another area in the world, and that area is our mind. 
For Locke, I think, that mind exists is a doubtless fact. It is doubtless fact that we have 
thought. And thought is a property which belongs to mind, and not to matter.by assumption or 
definition. In addition, we may give cultural or religious influence to his thought, 100. For 
Locke or Descartes, this dualism is necessary consequence from his scientific world view and 
certainty of existence of mind. 
As we know, Locke or Descartes adopted the causal theory of perception. Material body 
affected our body directly or indirectly through medium like light or a wave motion in air. 
Our sense organs is affected and these affection is transmitted to our brain through nerves. And 
as a result many phenomena appear in our mind. These phenomena are often called idea. 
The rough sketch of perception which I now showed is fami liar, but here is one source of 
mind-body problem. The last link between our brain and mind is very mysterious. Locke 
himself thinks our brain as the seat of our mind, buc he could not explain how our 111 ind exists 
in brain. 
Locke's predicament is simple. I lis explanation about our perception is a scientific and it 
is explained from third person perspective. Things used in the explanation is basically physical 
things. On the other hand. mind is not considered as physical thing. It does not have extension 
and weight. It cannot be seen. felt and tasted. After all, it is supposed to be as opposed to 
physical thing. We cannot discover a mind even if we cut our head and dissect our brain. It is 
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because of the definition of our mind that we cannot do it. 
2 
Now I delineated the mind-body problem in modem philosophy. Mind-body problem was 
caused by the spread of scient ific worldview. In other words, mind-bod problem is one 
example that the development of science threatens our preoccupied conceptions. "Threaten" 
may be too prejudiced expression. Rather we should say that scientific discoveries enlighten 
and improve our old-fashioned conception. Today's philosophy and naturalistic philosophy 
which revived in the 20th century may be said to be motivated by such thinking. Today's 
philosophy may be said to be an attempt lo solve the puzzle provided by modem philosopher 
like Descartes or Locke - using more scientific manners or thinking. Especial ly many 
naturalistic philosophers try to solve a puzzle on the base of scientific discoveries. For 
example, materialists like reductionists or eliminativists - try to define a mind on the base of 
scientific worldview. Of course reductionists and eliminativists are not the same. But they 
agree to each other with regard to their start point. They start by the thought that our outer 
world consist of material objects, and then reductionists would relate our mind to material 
objects, while the other would eliminate it. 
I think that we can point out another point they have in common. They think that physical 
world is the only real world or that physical world should be thought to be the same with facts. 
If they do not think so, they do not need to reduce mental things to physical things or to 
eliminate mental ones. By these reasons I include them under the same group. 
But is their direction the only one? I think the quite different way of thinking about mind-
body problem. That is, l think there is the quite different start point of thinking. And I think 
that I can find the key in Berkeley"s argument. Hereafter I want to present the way of defending 
both our mind and our material worlds. But my way is not the same with materia lists. My 
proposal has a possibility of defending both our mind and our material worlds as they are 
supposed to be by the ordinary people. But I am not the same with traditional dualists. For my 
proposal may support materialists in some cases. Berkeley is an idealist. My opinion seems to 
be similar with idealism in some degree, but I do not think these are the same. I will mention it 
later. 
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Berkeley's argument to which I especially pay attention is seen in his Three dialogues 
between Hy/as and Phi/onous. Hylas, who is thought to stand for Berkeley's opponents often 
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presents materialistic argument to Philonous - Berkeley. For example, Hy las presents the 
physiological argument to Philonous - an agent of Berkeley. According to llylas, The 
physiology of the days shows how our ideas are occurred in our mind through our body 
organs, nervous system and brain. And the explanation indicates that material substances (that 
is, our body and brain, etc. ) exist. To these arguments, Philonous answered as below. 
Phil. I would firs! know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. You make ce11ain 
traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me whether by che 
brain you mean any sensible thing. 
Hy/. What else think you I could mean? 
Phil. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things which are 
immediately perceivable arc ideas; and these exist only in the mind. Thus much you have, 
if l mistake not, long since agreed too>. 
ln this argument, Hylas· response is too bad. He should not have accepted that brain is a 
sensible thing. For philosophers like Locke, the brain which appears in the physiological 
explanation is not sensible or perceivable thing and therefore not ideas. But now, to set this 
problem aside, I should notice that there is an important point. It is that Berkeley docs not deny 
all scienti fie discoveries. The thing that he denies is that our perceptual system is not sensible. 
He replaced them by ideas. Berkeley says that our brain, nervous systems and sense organs are 
all ideas. But materialistic explanation of perception must also be modified if our perceptual 
system is changed to ideas. Now, if our brain and nervous systems are ideas. they ought not be 
the cause of our perception. Because Berkeley professes that only active things can be a 
"cause" and ideas are not active but inert. For Berkeley considered 'active· and 'voluntary' as 
the same thing. But how Berkeley managed to reconcile his ideal ism with then scientific 
discoveries? I consider that there is one solution to mind- body problem in his answer of this 
difficult task. 
Berkeley makes Philonous say as below in the Third Dialogue. 
Philonous [ · · ·) We are chained 10 a body: that is to say, our pcrceplions are connected 
with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every alteration in 
the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing 
but a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being 
perceived by a mind. So that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means 
no more than a correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas, or things 
immediately perceivable<2l . 
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As these words show, Berkeley accepts our sensations or ideas to be related with our 
body. But he says that our physiological events and our sensations (= psychological events) 
are both ideas and that both are correspondent with each other. Berkeley develops his theory 
about natural law in the Third Dialogue, though this theory was already stated in his first major 
book New Theory of Vision. His attitude for science is showed in below passage. 
To explain how the mind or soul of man simply sees, is one thing, and belongs lo 
Philosophy. To consider particles as moving in certin lines, rays of light as retracted, or 
relectcd, or crossing, or including angles, is quite another thing, and appertineth to 
Geometry. To account for the sense of vision by the mechanism of the eye, is a third thing, 
which appertaineth to Anatomy and experiments. These two latter speculations are of use 
in practice, to assist the defects and remedy the distempers of sight, agreeably to the 
natural laws contained in this mundane system. But the fonner theory is that which makes 
us understand the tme Theory of Vision, considered as a faculty of the soul. (The Theory 
of Vision: Vindicated and Explained § 43) 
When we connect this passage and the before-mentioned passage in Dialogues, we can 
understand Berkeley's claim more clearly. He claims that science - natural philosophy - itself 
cannot discover the essence of sight, but it is made use of by its usefulness for our ordinary 
practice, and is connected to our mental or psychological events. We can take Berkeley's claim 
as tbat we can connect various natural laws according to our aim or intention. In other words, 
Berkeley seems to say that we do not need to connect natural science to other natural laws 
necessarily, if we judge natural science not to be of use for our practice. He thinks that various 
natura l laws, including discoveries of science, are a kind of instruments(3l. That is, it seems to 
be a matter of judgment how to use a natural law(4J . I consider his theory of Natural law 
becomes a key to reconstruction of mind- body problem. 
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In perception, there arc some differences between what occurs in our body and what 
phenomena we have. For Berkeley, these two situations are different sets of ideas, or two 
natural laws. For Locke or the scientists of the days, what occurs in our physical body is 
material, objective, and real, but what phenomena we have is mental, subjective, and unreal. 
And the latter is the effect of the former. In other words, the fonner - what occurs in our body 
in perceplion - is more fundamental than the latter. Berkeley denies this thought and he insists 
that both arc on a par level with each other and there is no difference about fundamentality. 
If we think our scientific explanat ion is fundamental, real or the expression of the true 
world, we must redefine our conception of our mind or had beucr e liminate it. And this 
strategy has been adopted by many naturalistic philosophers who solve the puzzle presented 
by Descartes. But if we consider both what occurs in our body in perception and what 
phenomena we have on a par level, we can take another solution. 
Berkeley seems to state that we cannot adopt one natura l law as basic fact and the other as 
only phenomena. We can connect va rious natural laws by our various aims or usefulness. In 
other words we need not connect certain two natural laws if we th ink their connection is 
useless for our practical aim. 
Now I can replace Berkeley's natural law as 1enn "contexts". When we talk \~hat we see, 
feel. or sense, we do it in one context. For example, in dinner, we sit on chair and see dishes on 
the table. My friend who is a chef of this di1mer asks how her dinner looks to me. I answered 
to her "Very looking appetizing! This tomato's color is very beautiful!" After saying that, I taste 
th is dishes and then say "Very de licious. J keep this taste in mind forever!" Of course this story 
is dramatized a linlc. As I am very shy and a man of few words, l cannot say like above. But if 
I were in the situation like this story, our conversation is held in one context. We have a dinner 
together and talk about dishes with each other. The information we need is how her dishes 
appear to me, but not what occurs in my brain. And when I told my last words "J keep this 
taste in mind forever!", she will not ask me, "Well. thank you. But where is your mind'! ls your 
mind the same wi th your brain or function of it? Or is your mind unextended and immaterial 
substance?", if she is not a philosopher - maybe even if she is a philosopher. 
But if we are biologists who pay attention to micro stuff in the laboratory . the case is 
quite different. Our attention may be paid to physical phenomena exclusively. When we study 
what occurs in our body or what our body consists of, and when we discuss our 1heory with 
colleagues, we arc in different context from my dinner context. In this context we are not 
concern with the question of where mind is. 
Again if we are doctor and treat the man who has disorder of the sense of taste, the case is 
quite different, too. We must pay auention to our bodily event and want to relate it to our 
sensation. Even in this case, we are in quite different context to the above two cases. We arc 
concerned with bolh the objective status and the subjective s tatus different from my dinner 
situation. We may be said to be in a position that connects above two conteXls. 
I took up three contexts as instances. In l" case, we take comparatively na'ive attitude to 
the mind- body problem. We behave as if we had mind as we think we have. But we have no 
concern with what occurs in our physical body. Even in 2"" case, the mind-body problem does 
not appear clearly. The biologists have an interest with physical aspects of man only, and he 
studies or lalks about how stimulus affecting our sense organs is transmitted to our brain. It 
may not be important for him to ask where mind is or what mind is. If we take mind- body 
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problem seriously, it would be the 3ni case. But if we extend Berkeley's thought, I th ink we can 
escape the difficulty that seems to lurk in that case. 
We may think as this. What we do in the third case is to simply relate the first context to 
the second context for practice and create the third context. But the point l want to stress is 
that we relate two contexts not for achieving the metaphysical truth or disclosing one absolute 
fact about our body or mind, but for achieving our practical aim, for example, medical cure. 
Then if th is connection is useful for our aim, we should adopt it, despite whether it is concern 
with the metaphysical facts in our world or not. 
As already stated, philosophers traditionally search for the only one answer to the question 
what mind is. And today they, especially naturalists, often use scientific discoveries as basic 
fact to solve their problems. Their project may be regarded as showing one unified world view. 
Such project is certainly attractive to some philosophers, and l accept that there has been a 
thought that philosophy should search for showing such worldview. But l do not think that is 
the only one option. l think it is also the role of philosophy to show Lhat there is no unified 
worldview. 
From this point of view, I state my proposal on using above discussion. l suspect that 
there is no essence of the concept of mind, or there is the only answer to the question what 
mind is. Rather, I think that what mind is is detennined by situation or context where we use 
that conception. In some situations ( for example in re ligious) , we may talk about mind as if it 
is immaterial th ing, but in other situations, we may talk about mind as if it is physical th ing or 
it is an expression of function of our brain. In each situation or context, we can use the 
definition of mind differently, even if each definition may be contradictory with each other. 
But is there really contradiction? l doubt there is. For contexts are different. If we use the 
definition of a word differently in the same context, I admit that there is a serious contradiction 
and we use it unjustly. In such case we must unify the definition of words. But my proposal is 
not the same with such case. If we th ink that the definition of a word are determ ined by 
context, we do not need to think it is contradictory to give the word different concept in 
different context. 
Here we return to the three cases I took up above. (TJ1al is, dinner case etc.) About the 
first case (= my dinner situation) among them, some philosophers who try to present an 
unified worldview may think our usage in that case is immature, unscientific, not rigid, 
metaphorical etc. Some may say that our na'ive conception of "mind" is not proper as to fact. 
So if we make clear the truth of our world, we should remake our na'ive conception on base of 
science. 
This thought will oppose to the view l now presented. And this may be appealing to not 
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only philosophers bu1 ordinary people. Bul 1his rype of lhoughl is also 100 na'ivc. For il is the 
very philosophical problem to ask whal the fact is or whether we can get lhe truth. 
Here I will lake up 01her philosophers to defend my view. They are pragmatis1s. The 
1heories of pragma1is1s are various. and 1hey are differem with each Olher in some respec1s. But 
they seem to agree to each other in 1ha1 lhey don't accept an absolute fact 1hat we canno1 reach 
and that they deny lhere is an absolute distinction between fact and value. They would locate 
the criteria of truth within us - human. 
In twentieth century, the idea thal science is an accumulative knowledge system or the 
idea that science developed straightforwardly came to fa ll under suspicion. The discussion 
about scientific rcvolulion by Thomas Kuhn was taken up in many ways and this argument 
promoted 1he relativistic theses. Pragmatis1s of today are among philosophers who were much 
influenced by such trend. 
Some may think it is strange for me to take them up here. For Berkeley would not accept 
there is not absolute facts or truth, while pragmatists would not accept they are idealis1. 
Berkeley locates objective 1ru1h in God's mind and he asserts that even if our ideas are 
subjective and various, they are unifomlly ruled by God's benevolence. And he thinks that 
philosophy, not natural sciences, reveals the trulh of our world. Moreover I musl accep1 that 
the God's role and existence is the core of Berkeley's philosophy. 
But I think that Berkeley's argument gets closer to pragmatism, if we dare to ignore his 
religious aspecl, namely we limit our auenlion to his argument of natural law. As 1 have 
already stated, Berkeley accepts the connec1ion be1ween natural science and our ordinary 
phenomena by its utility. According to him, it is not because natural science has a privileged 
status for our knowledge that we use natural science for medical etc. It is not clear whether 
Berkeley lhinks that we can selecl other connection. Perhaps he does not lhink so. What is 
more, it is hard for us ourselves to selec1 a difTerem connection from the connection between 
na1ural science and our memal phenomena in medical scene. 13ut in spile of it, I can point out 
some similarity between Berkeley and pragmatists. 
Berkeley argues that our way of talking about various phenomena or our way of theorizing 
them depend on natural law. And nalural laws are chains of our ideas. Their existence depends 
on human in a sense. I said "in a sense", because it depends on God's will, too. Bul if il were 
not for human, lhere would not be natural Jaws. 
1 think tha l these points which we ca n see in Berlkelcy's argument are closer to 
pragmatists. Pragmatists of1en deny that 1ruth or fac1s are outside human's domain. 
For example Richard Rorty, who is known as the most radial philosopher of pragma1ists, 
denies lhe traditional epistemological enterprise. He continued to propose tha1 we should no1 
rely on inhuman authority. The inhuman aulhority by Rorty is God. trulh etc. ll is a denial of 
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absolute truth, in which we can include "fact". Besides Rorty, Hila1y Putnam denied the sharp 
crack between worth and fact<sl. Moreover, Nelson Goodman states about plurality of worlds 
as below. 
I think: many different world-versions are of independent interest and importance, without 
any requirement or presumption of reducibility to a single base(6) . 
I think that Berkeley's ·natural law' can be also replaced by Rorty's ·vocabulary' or 
Goodman's 'version'. It is the way of speaking of our world, and it is what we have been 
creating in various ways. 
5. 
I have stated my consideration by the hint of Berkeley's argument. But I do not think 
Bcrkclcy·s argument is unproblematic, so I will state a difficulty which Berkeley's argument 
has. 
A main difficulty arises from his idealism. 'The context" I mentioned is equal with natural 
laws or a set of ideas in Berkeley's argument. Now ideas are mental things, therefore Berkeley's 
world is just mental or subjective. But is it meaningful to say "All things in the world is mental 
or subjective"? If all things are mental or subjective, do these words "mental" or "subjective" 
have any mean? 
I think that words have their meaning by contrast with other th ings. For example, if 
solipsism were right, in other words, if there were only one person, would the conception of'T 
be generated? Did I need the conception of 'T? Does not the conception of "J" exist for 
distinguishing T ' from "he" or "you"? Of course Berkeley himself would guarantee something 
like the objective world. It is a domain of Mind of God. Berkeley seems to have only replaced 
the material substance by God . . In this point the structure he adopted is not fundamentally 
different from materialism. 
What we should do for avoiding this problem is to refrain from answering the question 
whether the framework of our world is mental or physical. Pragmatists including Putnam and 
Rorty denied the distinction between fact and value. But they do not present idealism, much 
less reductionism. Whether something is mental or physical should be detem1ined within the 
context, and it should be determined by people who join in the context. So we should not apply 
one conception to the context itself. If we decide not to do so, we can avoid idealism while we 
can focus on only the good points of Berkeley. 
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Now l am going to tell my conclusion of th is presentation. What I want to state first ly is 
that there is not the only one answer to what mind really is. And the result is that we cannot 
reduce our mind to our brains or some functions of them. In that respect, I am not a physicalist, 
but at the same time, I am not a traditional dualist, too. We can be not only an either of them, 
but also both of them. In one situation or context, we can talk as if mind were in our body but 
not in a physical form. Or in another situation, we can talk as if mind were the same with 
fw1ction of our brains. We can treat the relation between mind and body variously in various 
contexts. In its sense, I say that mind has various concepts, so I say that my thesis is pluralistic. 
Differently from Richard Rorty, I would not say it was useless to wrestle with the mind-
body problem as many namralists have done. And I would not say that we should stop such 
work. Such work has been contributing to us by enlarging our conceptions or creating new 
conceptions. And I think th is work wi ll have been contributing from now. I think that 
Philosophers should offer materials for many people to consider what concepts wc should use 
in some problems properly. Speaking about mind-body problem, we should not apply the only 
one concept to all fields, but try to ofTer various ways of thinking about which concept is 
proper to the one field - for example, law, ethics, or religion 7) etc., not to another. 
I would explain my position a little more. I do not intend to degrade science. I do not 
criticize scientific activities and reasonableness of science, but only criticize the view that all 
phenomena should be reduced to science, or that science renects what world really is. I want 
to cite Goodman's words again below. 
The pluralist, far from being anti-scientific, accepts the sciences at fuJI value. l lis typical 
adversary is the monopolistic materialist or physicalist who maintains that one system, 
physics, is preeminent and all- inclusive, such that every other version must eventually be 
reduced to i1 or rejected as false or rncaningless(Sl . 
I said that "we should offer materials to think what concepts we should use" in some 
fields. Then I did not say that we - philosophers should decide what concepts we use. For I do 
not think that the final decision of it is done within only the sphere of philosophy. For such 
questions are important for all people who join in the context. We should raise debates and 
have people interested in them. It seems to me that we had better find the answer of such 
question democratically. Philosophers should present various materials for such ddebates and 
show the possibilities of various considerations. Of course people can select the idea that we 
should set scientific discoveries as fundamental. And I will not reject such decision necessarily. 
But I want to emphasize that it is not because science stands near the facts but because many 
voters judge science to be useful for their aim that people gave science a privileged status. And 
in fact such judgment will be done in many cases. Science has remarkably contributed to us 
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and therefore it should be paid respect to. 
6 
In this section, I will illustrate one example for showing a merit o f my proposal. Mind-
body problem relates to other various problem of philosophy. 1 think one of these problems is 
free-wi ll problem. T his problem has been discussed for long time, too. And th is is s im ilar to 
our mind- body problem in regard tha t they are strong ly influenced by scientific discovery. Its 
similarity is natural. For we th ink that "will" is a mental property. So, if modern science 
threatens the traditional conception of mind, our free-will would be a lso threaten. If we consist 
of only physical things and physical things are connected to the preceding physical th ings 
causally, why can we say we have free-will which is thought to belong to menta l, not physical? 
I had interest with a short essay titled "Is free will an illusion?(9l " before. The writer is 
Martin Heisenberg, a famous biologist. He d iscusses the possib il ity of our free w ill on base of 
his research on bacterium. I summarize his argument. 
He begins w ith thought that (1) determinism threatens our free will. But h is research 
shows that bacteria do not act deterministically. They basically go straight forward seeking 
their food, but they often turn their direction at random. A nd "this 'random walk' can be 
modulated by sensory receptors , enabl ing the bacterium to find food and the right 
temperature CIOl ." Heisenberg applied th is act to more complex one that we human have. And 
he said that as with a bacterium's locomotion, the activation of behav ioural modules is based 
on the interplay between chance and lawfulness in the brain. That is, (2) our behavior includes 
elements of chance. His argument shows that our behavior cannot reduce to a relation between 
input and output of our stimuli. As a result, our behavior may originate within our body itself 
in some degrees and (3) we have possibility of defending our free-will from detennin istic 
threat. 
He connects an factor of chance with self-originating of behavior, so as to defend our free-
wi l I. His strategy may be sa id to be the one that many compatibi lists selected. They will 
preserve the free-will by change its concepts. But their theories have some d ifficulties - of 
course if not so, th is problem should have a lready been solved. As one example, we can see 
the above argument. 
In above summery, a thesis (1 ) is an assumption which is often shared by philosophers 
and which may be said to the cause of free-will problem. So we can accept it for the present. 
The (2) is the result of Professor Heisenberg's research, so we can accept it. But it is certa in 
that the reasoning from premise (2) to (3) is problematic. Many philosophers on th is problem 
have already realized that we cannot conserve free-will even if we could escape from 
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determ inism. For lhe randomness or chancy is inconsistent with our being able to select 
something by our own will. 
Of course I know that Heisenberg·s proposal is just one example of many proposals. But 
what I want to say is that we need not be worried about conservation of free-will which was 
threalen by scientific discovery. In some cases we may not adopt biological study imo our 
legislative or social system by force. TI1cy have their own history and sphere. I think that we 
can handle each field and the combination of them at our own discretionO ll . 
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